

## Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors in Brussels 1980 – 2010

Interest Representation and Lobbying

**Kjell A. Eliassen**  
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## OM RAPPORTEN


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## NORSK SAMMENDRAG

# Norske ikke-statlige aktørers lobbyvirksomhet i Brussel 1980 – 2010

**Kjell A. Eliassen og Pavlina Peneva**

Dette er en studie av norske ikke-statlige aktørers lobbyvirksomhet overfor EU. Den er basert på en spørreundersøkelse blant de ulike aktørene, interesseorganisasjoner, regionale kontorer, bedrifter og lobbyfirmaer samt intervjuer med en del sentrale personer i disse organisasjonene. Av de 40 organisasjoner og selskaper som vi har identifisert som relevante for undersøkelsen svarte 28 på spørreskjemaet vårt. Av de 22 som har kontor i Brussel, svarte 21 på spørreskjemaet. Av de 28 er det tolv interesseorganisasjoner, seks regionale kontorer, syv norske bedrifter og tre lobby firmaer.

Fokuset i studien er på de ikke-statliges aktørenes interesserrepresentasjon overfor EU og deres deltakelse og lobbyvirksomhet i relasjon til EUs politikk. Lobbyvirksomhet i forhold til EU har vært et interessant tema i studier av europeisk integrasjon helt siden 70-tallet. Det er likevel først på begynnelsen av 90-tallet at vi opplevde en sterk stigning i antall publiserte artikler om emnet. Dette kan forklares med den sterke økningen i lobbyvirksomheten i forbindelse med etableringen av indre markedsprogrammet i EU.

Denne studien analyserer EU-lobbying fra norske ikke-statlige aktører, men det bør også nevnes at stater og regjeringer også lobbyer i Brussel i forhold til EU institusjonene. Dette gjelder ikke bare land som USA og Kina, men også Norge og Sveits, særlig på de områder der vi ikke er med i selve beslutningsprosessen. Selv EU-landene driver også med lobby aktiviteter, i tillegg til å være representert i institusjonene i unionen.

Tallene for norske frivillige interesseorganisasjoner eller bedrifter, som har etablert representasjonskontor i Brussel har økt, særlig i slutten av 90 årene og etter århundreskiftet, men de er fortsatt relativt begrenset i antall sammenlignet med for eksempel Sveits og Sverige.

Alle de norske aktører i vår studie rapporterte at EU-politikk er av stor betydning for dem og for deres medlemmer eller klienter. Regionale kontorer rapporterer imidlertid om noe mindre betydning av EU-politikk for dem. De er også ofte i Brussel av andre årsaker som

for eksempel å representere regionen eller å søke på EU-midler.

Når det gjelder registrering i lobbyregistrene i Brussel, hadde bare 50 prosent av de norske ikke-statlige aktørene registrert seg i det parlamentariske registeret, og for EU-kommisjonens register var tallet 43 prosent. Begge tallene er lavere enn man kunne forvente fra norske organisasjoner og bedrifter som jobber for større åpenhet.

Det viktigste de ulike aktørene gjør i forhold til EU er informasjonsinnhenting, enten de jobber fra Brussel eller fra Oslo. De bruker imidlertid også mer tid på å prøve å påvirke EU-beslutninger enn det som er antatt i litteraturen om lobbyvirksomhet i Brussel. Muligens kan dette henge sammen med at norske ikke statlige interesser ikke har de samme muligheter for innflytelse gjennom medlemslandets regjeringskontorer eller medlemslandets representanter i EUs institusjoner. Informasjonsinnhentning har enn rangering på 3.71 ut av 5.00, mot 2.93 for aktiviteter rettet mot å påvirke beslutninger.

Den klart viktigste institusjon for alle typer norske aktører er EU-kommisjonen (4.80) med Europaparlamentet på andre plass (3.88). Betydningen av kommisjonen er også nært knyttet til det faktum at alle aktører ser de tidlige stadiene av politikktutforming som den viktigste scenen for å prøve å påvirke. Blant de ulike DGs er de viktigste Energy, Climate Action, Transport, Environment, Competition, Inner Market, Industry, Research og Digital Agenda, alle disse er opptatt av enten viktige områder i norsk politikk eller sektorer der Norge har et svært tett samarbeid med EU.

For å bli vellykket i EUs lobbyvirksomhet, må man etter aktørenes mening ha et langsiktig perspektiv og kontinuitet i sitt arbeid, dette var rangert med 4.56 som den viktigste strategien. Dette er også understreket ved at den nest viktigste faktoren er å ansette medarbeidere med lang erfaring i håndtering av EU og EU-lobbying. De viktigste måtene å påvirke beslut-

ninger på er å gjøre det indirekte gjennom europeiske paraplyorganisasjoner (4.15). Bruken av den norske delegasjonen og norske statlige institusjoner blir også forholdsvis lavt rangert (henholdsvis 2.88 og 2.63) sammenlignet med andre typer av kanaler. Store selskaper har egne kanaler for påvirkning, både gjennom sine europeiske føderasjoner og gjennom datterselskaper. Et interessant aspekt når det gjelder rollen til Brusselkontorene for noen av selskapene var ikke bare at de arbeidet med EU-institusjonene og EU-regjeringene omkring EUs politikk, men også arbeider med utenlandske regjeringer og EU-institusjoner for å fremme selskapenes interesser også i andre deler av verden.

Å delta i EU-finansierte prosjekter er også et viktig aspekt for alle norske ikke-statlige aktører i Brussel. Bevilgningen er som sådan ikke nødvendigvis det viktigste, men heller å bruke disse prosjektene til å knytte kontakter, finne samarbeidspartnere og utvikle nye prosjekter for sine medlemsorganisasjoner eller selskapet hjemme.

Studien analyserer også betydningen av EFTA og norske institusjoner for norske ikke-statlige aktører. Den viser at EFTA ikke er en svært viktig kanal for EU-lobbyvirksomhet (2.38) og det samme for ESA (2.59). Det er imidlertid store forskjeller mellom aktørene. Norske aktører rapporterer at de har mer kontakt med kommisjonen enn med EFTA, og en viktig årsak til den lave scoren for EFTA er at EFTA ikke er involvert i beslutningsprosessen. Når det gjelder den nordiske dimensjonen viser det seg at aktørene ikke ser på de andre nordiske land som en god kanal for norsk innflytelse – i hvert fall ikke dersom interessene ikke er sammenfaldende.

Den norske EU-delegasjonen var for de fleste av aktørene som ble intervjuet av begrenset betydning for påvirkning under normale forhold. Organisasjonene og selskapene hadde sine egne - ofte mer verdifulle - kontakter i EU-systemet og har gjennom europeiske organisasjoner og forbund de var medlem av, også mer direkte tilgang til EUs beslutningsprosess. Ved store utfordringer i forhold til EU eller kriser i en bestemt norsk sektor, kan den norske EU-delegasjonen og den norske regjeringen, være viktigere. Dette var tilfellet også helt tilbake på 1980-tallet.

Våre intervjuer viste også at den norske EU-delegasjonen er lite relevant for mange norske aktører i Brussel, også når det gjelder informasjonsinnhenting. De fleste av interesseorganisasjoner pleier å få sin informasjon gjennom sine europeiske føderasjoner eller søsterorga-

nisasjoner i medlemslandene, og være bedre informert enn representanter ved delegasjonen. Videre får de også ofte informasjon tidligere. Noen aktører følte at de hadde mer å fortelle de aktuelle rådgiverne i delegasjonen når det gjelder saken det dreide seg om, enn omvendt. Dette mønsteret går også i noen grad igjen for de relevante departementene.

Våre data bekrefter at de viktigste måtene å påvirke beslutningene er ved å arrangere møter direkte (4.12) og/eller indirekte gjennom europeisk paraplyforeninger (4.15). Bruk av den norske delegasjonen (2.88) og norske statlige institusjoner (2.63) gir resultater som er lave sammenlignet med andre typer kanaler. Når det gjelder selskaper, finner vi det samme mønsteret, bare enda mer tydelig. Videre kan ikke-statlige aktører lobbe på vegne av norske myndigheter - de har ofte tilgang til deler av EUs beslutningssystem som ikke er åpent for norske myndigheter.

Totalt 19 respondenter av 28 sa at det norske ikke-medlemskap i EU var en ulempe i deres lobbyvirksomhetsinnsats. De som var uenige var hovedsakelig regionale organisasjoner, interesseorganisasjoner med sterke bånd til søsterorganisasjoner i medlemslandene, eller noen få selskaper med datterselskaper i medlemsstatene.

Rapporten diskuterer også om norske organisasjoner trenger mer ressurser for å være innflytelsesrike, enn en bedrift eller interesseorganisasjon fra en medlemsstat. Både våre intervjuer og våre data tyder på at mange av organisasjonene føler at de trenger ekstra ressurser for å få innflytelse i EU, som en aktør fra utsiden. Ellers måtte de bruke sine europeiske forbund, medlemsorganisasjoner eller datterbedrifter i medlemslandene for å utøve innflytelse. Å komme fra et ikke-medlemsland er dermed en klar ulempe dersom målet er å påvirke EUs beslutningsprosess.

Som en konklusjon viser vår studie at et flertall av aktørene som er involvert i EU-lobbying finner at vårt forhold til EU gjennom EØS-avtalen og flere andre avtaler og institusjonelle ordninger, i stedet for fult medlemskap, virker begrensende på deres evne til å drive lobbyvirksomhet overfor EU. Disse begrensningene er sett for eksempel i forhold til Sverige, først og fremst knyttet til mangelen på norske representanter i Europaparlamentet og Ministerrådet og i andre EU-institusjoner som aktørene kunne kontakte, og manglende evne for Norge, over tid, til å bygge opp en grunnleggende forståelse av de norske interessene i de ulike delene av beslutningssystemet i EU.

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# Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors in Brussels 1980 – 2010: Interest Representation and Lobbying

Kjell A. Eliassen og Pavlina Peneva

## Executive summary

This report addresses the question of Norwegian non-governmental interest representation and lobbying towards the EU. 28 Norwegian organisations responded to our questionnaire and we have also interviewed some of the main actors. The focus has been on their EU lobbying defined in a rather wide and comprehensive manner, covering everything from gathering information to trying to influence EU decision-making.

Norwegian non-governmental actors see EU policies as being of major importance for them and their members. Gathering information is the most dominant activity in EU lobbying. Both our questionnaire and our interviews indicate, however, that Norwegian actors see influencing EU decisions as more important, both in terms of purpose and time spent, than assumed in the literature on lobbying. This could be linked to the fact that Norway is not an EU member and thus our organisations will not have the same access to other channels of influence through home country governments or nationals from their own country working in the different EU institutions.

21 of our respondents have an office in Brussels. The first organisation to set up an office in Brussels was NHO in 1973, the next two organisations were LO in 1991 and the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) in 1993. The rapid increase in the representation in Brussels came after the EEA treaty was established in 1994 and after 2000.

By far the most important target institution for all types of Norwegian actors is the European Commission followed by the European Parliament. The importance of the Commission is also closely linked to the fact that all actors see the early stages of policy shaping as the most important stage to try to influence.

In order to become successful in EU lobbying, the actors were not prioritising budget and staff, but rather having a long-term perspective and continuity in their work. The most important way of influencing decisions is indirectly through European umbrella associations while companies have their own channels of influence, both through their European federations and through daughter companies.

EFTA is not a very important channel for EU lobbying. Norwegian actors report that they have more contact with the Commission than with EFTA, and one important reason for the low importance is the total lack of EFTA involvement in the decision-making phase. The Norwegian Mission to the EU is also of limited importance under normal conditions. The organisations and the companies had their own – and often more valuable – contacts in the EU system. However, in case of major problems with the EU or crises in a certain sector, the Norwegian Mission and the Norwegian government are more important. The Mission is rather irrelevant for many Norwegian actors in Brussels, even for information gathering. The interest organisations are often getting the information earlier through their European federations.

19 of 28 respondents said that the Norwegian non-membership of the EU was a drawback in their lobbying efforts. Those who disagreed with this statement were mainly regional organisations, interest organisations with strong links to sister organisations in member states or a few companies with daughter companies in member states. Many of the Norwegian actors feel that they need additional resources to gain influence in the EU, or they have to use their European federations or daughter companies to exercise influence. The limitations of non-membership are the lack of Norwegian nationals in all the different EU institu-

tions which the actors could contact and the inability of Norway to build over time a basic understanding of Norwegian core interests in the different parts of the EU decision-making system.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The aim of this study is to analyse interest representation and lobbying of Norwegian non-governmental actors towards the EU institutions and its decision-making process in the period from around 1980 to 2010. The main emphasis will be on the last 10 years. The focus will lie on their overall involvement with the EU and their participation and lobbying in relation to different EU policies, mainly regarding EEA related issues, but also other areas of EU policy-making and programs. We will here use “EU lobbying” in a rather wide and comprehensive manner covering everything from gathering information, distributing information within its own company or to members, representing members or companies in Brussels, general contact with EU institutions, as well as the more narrow definition – trying to influence EU decision-making. For most actors, studies of EU lobbying indicate clearly that gathering information is the most dominant activity and they are seldom engaged in influencing the decisions taken at EU level.

We focus on non-governmental actors, but it should be noted that also national governments lobby in Brussels. This is the case not only for countries outside the EU, like the US and China, and Norway and Switzerland with their special formal relationship to the EU, but also EU member states are often involved in lobby activities in addition to taking part in the different decision-making forums where they are represented.

The actors under investigation in this study are both interest organisations and regional offices, which will be our main concern, but also Norwegian companies and Norwegian lobbying firms in Brussels. We have also tried to include Norwegian law firms with representation in Brussels, but they seem to avoid a definition as a lobbying organisation. We have also identified 6 Norwegian media organisations operating out of Brussels, but their activities are of another kind even if they are non-governmental actors. All in all our population of actors for analysis consist of 40 organisations and companies which we found were active in interest representation towards the EU in 2010 both in Brus-

sels and out of Oslo. 28 of the organisations responded to our questionnaire, 22 of them with office in Brussels. Of the 28 we find 12 interest organisations, 6 regional offices, 7 Norwegian companies and 3 lobbying companies (a complete list of the 28 actors responding to our questionnaire can be found in Figure 3).

We will investigate both those organisations which are established in Brussels and those who are doing their interest representation and lobbying towards the EU and the EU member states from their headquarters in Norway or through daughter companies or sister organisations in EU member states. The main questions addressed in this study for all groups under investigation are: which type of actors are they, what do they do when lobbying, what kind of resources do they have, the more complex pattern of EU lobbying – together with whom are they lobbying the EU and finally to what extent they have been successful in their lobbying activities and The main focus will be on those lobbying the EU in Brussels, but we will also to some extent investigate how those actors without an office in Brussels are operating and what are their arguments for not establishing an office in Brussels.

EU lobbying has been an important topic in the analysis of the EC and EU institutions and decision-making process since the 1970s. Dusan Sidjanski, from the University of Geneva, published in 1967 his chapter on “Pressure Groups and European Economic Community” Since then there have been numerous studies of different types of interest organisations, interest representations and lobbying in different sectors of EU decision-making, and with different theoretical perspectives. Richardson (2006) gives in his handbook article a comprehensive overview of this field of analysis. Even if studies of EU lobbying started earlier, the rapid increased in volume came in the beginning of the 1990s as a consequence of the Single European Act and the big success of the internal market program (Andersen and Eliassen 1991; Greenwood 2003). We will try to use the theories and findings regarding EU lobbying in the literature over the last 20 years as a background for our own investigations of the Norwegian non-governmental actors. At the same time we will use this more general investigation as a yardstick to put the Norwegian representation and activities into perspective.

There exist, however, very few academic articles on Norwegian non-governmental organisations and EU lobbying. One which at least partly deals with Norwegian interest representation to the EU in the EEA case constitutes an article discussing this topic in relation

<sup>1</sup> We appreciate very much the valuable comments and corrections to this report from Marit Sjøvaag-Marino, Svein S. Andersen and Tom Antonissen. We would like to thank Sandra Westermarck Messel for her assistance in collecting material and editing parts of this report.

to a more general study of the functioning of the EEA (Claes 2003). There is also a book-chapter comparing Nordic regional interest representation in Brussels (Lein-Mathisen 2004). Gullberg (2007) has compared lobbying in the EU and in Norway, but she is not focusing only on Norwegian organisations activities in Brussels. Four master theses have been written in Norway on this subject (Arvolaa 2008; Hansen 2005; Larsen 2009; Paulsen 2005). Regarding journal articles, newspaper articles and reports, there is also a surprisingly limited amount of material available. The number of scholarly articles and chapters about Swedish EU lobbying is also limited and confined to studies of regional representation in Brussels (Berg and Lindal 2007; Jerneck and Gidlund 2001).

The numbers of Norwegian non-governmental interest organisations or companies, which have established representation office in Brussels, have increased, especially after the turn of the century. The number is still, however, rather limited. We will investigate the changes over time in the EU involvement by different types of Norwegian non-governmental actors. Issues/questions to be dealt with include: When do they start working with EU issues and when do they eventually come to Brussels and why. An office in Brussels or at least somebody from these organisations living permanently in Brussels and working part time or full time for the organisation is estimated in all studies of EU lobbying to be a very important asset both to gather information and to exercise influence. Moreover, the presence in Brussels is needed for developing networking activities, which are considered to be an important element towards a successful lobbying.

We also focus on what the different actors do in relation to the EU, like information gathering, lobbying, getting EU funding for projects for their organisation or being a Brussels' representation office for the region or the company they represent in order to, among other tasks, coordinate with other actors in the European capital. Information gathering is perhaps the most important task for all the different actors both if they work from Brussels or from home – nowadays simply gathering information does not necessary require permanent presence in Brussels, as most information is available on internet. Another element of our current analysis is to find out which EU institutions, DGs in the European Commission and committees in the European Parliament are the most important for the NGOs and for the companies. How do they approach the institutions and what tools do they employ for lobbying?

Their strategy, one could assume, is closely linked to the kind of resources they have available for EU activities. Important resources are budget, membership, competence, links to other Norwegian actors and their membership of, and involvement with, different European federations.

To what extent are the non-governmental actors working through or in cooperation with the Norwegian Mission in Brussels, EFTA and governmental institutions in Oslo? Do some of them work successfully through their European federations or through daughter companies or sister organisations in EU member states? Another aspect will be to try to find out to what extent the Norwegian non-governmental organisations actually have influence on different issues and how they are successful. What are the most important channels of more complex influence where different actors operate together to lobby the EU institutions and decision-making?

We will also try, to the extent that we have information, to compare some of the characteristics of the Norwegian non-governmental interest representation in Brussels with the role and functioning of Swedish and Swiss non-governmental actors. The material at our disposal is, however, limited.

In the concluding section we will discuss how the findings we have discovered in this study are linked to the shifting relationship between Norway and the EU and if the particular characteristics of the EEA treaty compared to full membership like for Sweden or a Swiss solution of a large amount of bilateral treaties could explain some of the logic of Norwegian lobbying activities in Brussels.

The findings in this study are mainly based on a survey among Norwegian non-governmental actors involved in EU interest representation and lobbying and interviews with some of the most important Norwegian actors both in interest organisations, companies and some important institutions. See figure 3 for a list of the organisations and companies who have responded to the questionnaire and Appendix 2 for the questionnaire. A complete list of the persons interviewed is presented in an Appendix 1. Both the questionnaire and our interviews with key Norwegian actors in Brussels are based on the more general knowledge of EU lobbying we have acquired from the general literature about this subject and our knowledge about the history of the relationship between Norway and the EU.

Let us first, however, look at the concept of lobbying in relation to EU institutions and activities in particular.

## Lobbying in the EU

In contrast to the situation in Washington, where lobbying is well established, the lobbying system in Brussels is still under development and constantly changing. For this reason, lobbying in Brussels also includes activities aimed at simply acquiring information about how the system works and establishing the participant as an important actor, which are initial steps that are seen as preconditions for influencing decision-making.

Lobbying in the EU is an informal mechanism for getting information and exerting influence. The major distinction is normally between liberal interest group competition and neo-corporatist integrated participation in elite networks. Lobbying is usually associated with the former, but even in highly corporatist societies like Sweden and Norway we can also identify an increasing use of lobbying strategies. We must also have in mind that lobbyists are not necessarily representatives of interest groups. In principle everyone can engage in lobbying. In systems characterised by a relatively fragmented policy-making process, the lobbying process itself often has a genuine impact on results. This is a key lesson from EU-lobbying (Andersen and Eliassen 2003).

The lobbying process directed towards EU institutions, policy-making processes and various policies can be divided into four major stages; 1) Establishing actors at the European scene, 2) developing strategies, 3) gaining access and getting information and 4) acquiring opportunities for influence.

Even if this report focuses on the role of non-governmental Norwegian organisations and companies working towards the EU either through an office in Brussels or from Norway or from daughter companies in other countries, the increased Norwegian EU lobbying is part of a more general development of an increase in the last 40 years of EU interest representation and lobbying. To day all the key political actors in Europe, such as companies, interest groups, governments and local authorities, are directing a large part of their attention towards the EU and a substantial part, even for member states' governments, can in our view be characterised as lobbying. This increased attention is closely linked to the revitalisation of the EU through the successful launch of the internal market and the general expansion of EU legislation and other programs. In addition, the enlargement with new member

states and increased importance, both politically and economically, of the EU on the global scene has also increased the number of actors involved in EU lobbying (Andersen and Eliassen 2003).

## The dimensions of lobbying

Lobbying strategies as described in the literature have several aspects, like gaining access to important information, establishing visibility and confidence among key actors, gaining access to policy-making processes and being able to influence the progress, likelihood of success and the actual content of an outcome. Some actors build strategies around specific competences or issues. These actors cover everything from attending scientific conferences, visiting key universities and research centres, collecting and preparing background material and presenting written input to central actors in an ongoing process. Other actors are more reactive, responding to agenda setting or initiatives from partners and competitors. Some actors, through their experience, resources and legitimacy, may serve as catalysts and coalition builders.

*Gaining access* is linked both to actors' reputation and strategic competence. In other words, the likelihood of gaining access may partly depend upon a long-term commitment to the policy-making system in Brussels. Generally, access to top-level decision-makers is quite restricted, but is more open at lower levels. However, this does not necessarily imply that higher-level contacts are always more important. Key elements of proposals are developed and formulated by key personnel in different units of the Commission. Still, access is not the same as influence: the number of actors with access is much larger than those with impact.

*Influence* is difficult to measure as it is often hard to identify input measures relating to the influence of particular interests in final decisions. In principle, however, types of influence vary with the stages of the decision-making processes. At the earliest stage of Commission's preparations, before a proposal becomes official, lobbying is often highly technical (legal or technological) or, in some cases related to high level political interests in the member states. When technical aspects dominate lobbying, specialised competence may outweigh representativeness. In the middle stage, when the proposal is processed in the Council and the Parliament, technical lobbying is often still the key to influence, but the importance of representativeness (and nationality) increases. In the final stages, as decisions are made within the Council, or in deliberations between the Council, Commission and Parliament, the political aspects will be more important (Andersen and

Eliassen 2003).

### The rapid expansion of EU lobbying

The development of the total number of lobbying organisations in Brussels and the number of lobbyists is difficult to assess. Immediately after 1957, Europe-wide pressure groups were established within the various areas of Community policy. By 1970, more than 300 Euro-groups could be identified (Philip 1987). The Community institutions have always been a target for lobbying. However, both the volume and style of lobbying have since changed dramatically in several phases – first in the 80s and 90s with the success of the internal market and then in the last 10 years with the increased importance of the European Parliament in the decision-making process.

In 1980, Community officials registered all of the formally recognized Euro-groups, and at that stage they numbered 439. In addition there were unrecognised Euro-groups and other lobbies active in Brussels (Philip 1987). The limited number reflects the fact that the EC was in a period of stagnation and that time the EC decision-making was organized around inputs through national channels. By the end of the 1980s the number of lobbyists had increased ten times since the early 1970s, and it had increased four times since 1985. This explosive growth was due to the invasion of professional lobbyists, accounting firms, legal advisors and representatives of individual companies, regions and cities (Andersen and Eliassen 2003).

From the mid 1980s it was clear that something was going to happen to the EC. This was reflected in the growth in the number of associations and lobbyists taking an interest in Brussels. A survey conducted in 1985/86 registered 659 federations at the European level represented in Brussels, and about 6,000 lobbyists and national interest associations in member countries deemed to be of relevance for the policy-making process in Brussels (Morris, Boehm, and Vileinskas 1986).

The Single European Act represented a revitalisation of the decision-making system in Brussels. The 279 directives to be implemented before 1992 suddenly turned the EC into an important political arena. The growth of direct lobbying of the EC's institutions also contributed towards developing a European political system independent of the member states. All the important actors in European politics, e.g. businesses, trade unions and other interests groups and local and national authorities, focused on the EC system. This increased interest for the EC's central institutions was closely linked to the internal market and the general

expansion of the EC's spheres of competence.


There are no exact figures for the total number of lobbyists in 1990, but all estimates indicated that lobbying exploded in the period between 1987 and 1990. Attempts made in 1990 to estimate the total number of interest groups or lobbyists generally varied between 3,000 and 10,000, depending on how 'lobbyist' was defined. The highest number includes all those who tried to get access to key actors in EC decision-making, including those who came to Brussels to pursue particular issues, as well as those who were more permanently positioned in the European capital. There seemed to be a general consensus, however, about the explosive nature of this phenomenon in the late 1980s. Economically, it became a growth business, worth about 100 million pounds a year in 1990 and increasing at the rate of 100 percent a year (Bartholomew and Brooks 1989; Newman 1990; Zagorin 1989).

Today there exist several estimates of the total number of lobbying organisations and lobbyists. According to the Commission, overall approximately 15,000 lobbyists are operating in Brussels nowadays, ranging from public affairs consultants, in-house lobbyists, trade associations, NGOs, and law firms to think-thanks (however the exact number is unknown). Of these 15,000, some 5,000 lobbyists operate in the European Parliament alone (EurActiv, 10 June 2008). More than 70% of all lobbyists work directly or indirectly for corporate interests, some 20% represent the interests of regions, cities and international institutions while only around 10% represent non-governmental organisations, including trade unions, public health organisations or environmental groups. At the end of the 1990s the rapid growth in the number of lobbyists in Brussels ended up with an estimated 3000 organisations lobbying the EU either from Brussels or from their home country.

The number of lobbying organisations today is still difficult to assess, nevertheless it is estimated that some 2.500 lobby organisations work in Brussels, distributed as shown in Figure 1.

**FIGURE 1** Type of lobbying organisations

(EU public and government affairs, 10-11 February 2011)



Although lobbyists are increasingly recognised by EU policy-makers as a legitimate part of the democratic process and providers of useful information to decision-makers, lobbyists are often mistrusted by civil society and suffer from a negative reputation.

In 2008 the total annual turnover in the “lobbying business” was estimated to reach €1bn [\$1.5bn] to influence decision-makers in Brussels.

In the late 1980s, all stages were characterised by unclear requirements and relatively high degree of openness. The key to success was to be present and know where and how to lobby. There were important variations across sectors. Some sectors, like agriculture, but also labour market policy, had elements of corporatist structure and modus operandi. Other sectors, like finance and shipping, were characterised by few actors, but a low level of institutionalisation of the lobbying process. Most sectors were characterised by many actors, many access points and unclear rules and procedures governing the lobbying process. At that time, several factors pointed towards the need for a higher degree of institutionalisation. There were at least two important reasons behind the tendency towards institutionalisation:

One reason was the limited capacity of the EU decision-making system to handle the great number and variety of inputs. First, the number of interest representatives in Brussels increased dramatically from 1985 to 1995. Second, the number of states in the EU and the EEA increased. Third, the possible symbolic impact of Brussels as the capital of Europe and the necessity

to be present there cannot be excluded.

Another reason was the changing authority and decision-making logic of the EU-system. Again, there were several factors at play. One was the breakthrough of supranational authority, introducing qualified majority voting in the Council and co-operation and co-decision with the Parliament. Another factor was the increased institutionalisation of policy- and law-making at the EU-level. One indicator is the increased importance of the so-called first pillar and thus the expansion of the Community method, which implies the involvement of all actors including the European Parliament, the High Court of Justice and the European Commission in the decision-making process. Since 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty the pillar structure is gone and most issues are dealt with according to the community method. The continuous growth in the importance of the European Parliaments also had a major impact on the lobbying patterns in Brussels during the last decennium. The tendencies of changing importance of EU institutions and the increased use of majority voting are also well illustrated in the development of the analytical focus and arguments in the literature on lobbying (Andersen and Eliassen 1998; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). The general conclusion is that there is no clear pattern emerging with respect to the organization of lobbying and the strategies for gaining influence. On the contrary, there are great variations with respect to what kind of actors are mobilised and how they pursue their interests.

Although specialised expertise in policy-making is more important in the EU than in the member states,

the result is not institutionalisation of clear patterns of participation. The role of expertise limits the ways one can express political arguments. However, it can also be seen as an extension of a political discourse that allows actors without a shared language, values etc. to be accepted as legitimate participants. Thus, experts tend to discipline the discourse without establishing boundaries of political participation. In principle, anyone holding the relevant expertise, or being able to buy it, has access.

Moreover, EU-level lobbying has in many cases become as important as, or even more important than, national level lobbying. More and more of national policy initiatives and proposed new legislation are linked to or are direct consequences of EU initiatives more generally and directives more particularly. This could be why, as we will discuss in the next section, Norwegian non-governmental actors are becoming much more active on the European scene (Andersen and Eliassen 2003).

### EU rules and practices for lobbying

Lobbying has been a long-standing and contentious issue in European Parliamentary debates. Positions vary widely and traditions in the 27 EU member states are diverse. In the majority of countries there are no provisions at all for dealing with these groups at the parliamentary or governmental level. On the other hand, lobbying in the US is much more regulated; there exist almost 600 pages of explanations to get everything right. Nowadays, however, there is a large consensus that interest groups provide valuable expertise to EU law-making authorities.

The European Commission's definition of lobbying states "*activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision making processes of the European institutions*". This is also in line with article 4 in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, defining lobbyists as "*persons who wish to enter Parliament's premises frequently with a view to supplying information to Members within the framework of their parliamentary mandate in their own interests or those of third parties*".

The European Parliament has had its own register for lobbyists from as long ago as 1996, as well as a 10-point Code of Conduct (set out in Annex IX of the Parliament Rules of Procedure), which obliges lobbyists to act according to high ethical standards. The register is already de facto mandatory, because registering is a prerequisite for gaining access to the Parliament (although occasional visits merely require

registering on the day of accessing the building). The Code of Conduct requires lobbyists to refrain from any action designed to obtain information dishonestly and moreover not to claim any formal relationship with Parliament in dealing with third parties. Lobbyists are accordingly required to register and are issued with special badges, which distinguish them from other visitors (Lehman 2003).

On 9 November 2005 the European Commission launched the European Transparency Initiative, followed by a public consultation that allowed stakeholders to have their say on three aspects of transparency in the European Union:

1. Transparency and Interest Representation, which underpins a debate on lobbying activities in the EU;
2. The Commission's minimum standards for consultation, which provides a structured framework for feedback on the application of the standards;
3. Publication of Data on Beneficiaries of EU Funds, which has launched a debate on the disclosure of data about the recipients of various EU funds managed by the Commission in partnership with Member States, notably the Structural Funds and Common Agricultural Policy.

However, the public debate focused almost exclusively on the issue of lobbyists (Antonissen 2010).

In May 2008 the Parliament approved the report on "Framework for the activities of lobbyists in the EU institutions" (The European Parliament 2008). The report sends a strong message to the European Commission by calling for a mandatory register, including lobbyists' names, their clients or funders and financial disclosure on registered lobbying activities.

Despite the wishes of the Parliament, the European Commission set up its own voluntary register in June 2008 (The European Commission 2011). The register features three main categories of lobbyists: 1) professional consultancies and law firms; 2) corporate lobbyists and trade associations and 3) NGOs and think tanks. Registration is voluntary but organizations that decide to sign up have to adhere to a Code of Conduct and disclose financial estimations. The requirements for disclosure in the register vary for all three categories:

- Professional consultancies and law firms must

disclose total revenue related to lobbying the EU institutions, either by placing their clients in boxes representing absolute amounts (brackets of €50,000) or percentages (brackets of 10%);

- Corporate ,in-house‘ lobbyists and trade associations must provide an estimate of their costs associated with the direct lobbying of all the EU institutions;
- NGOs and think tanks must publish the overall budget of their organisation and indicate their main sources of funding, for example public monies (European, national or sub-national).

As regards the code of conduct, it first describes a few general principles, which should pertain to interest representatives in general. Consequently, lobbyists signed up to the Register are expected to apply the principles of openness, transparency, honesty and integrity, as legitimately expected of them by citizens and other stakeholders.

It is worth mentioning also that the Commission’s definition of interest representation does not include activities concerning legal and other professional advice, in so far as they relate to the exercise of the fundamental right to a fair trial of a client, such as carried out by lawyers. The latter are often insisting on their obligations of client confidentiality as a reason not to sign up to the register and thus having to name their clients. The Commission clarified, however, that law firms that are also engaged in lobbying for their clients should separate these activities from classical legal representation and thus register themselves in the register in the same category as consultancies.

Additionally, activities of the social partners as actors in the social dialogue (such as trade unions and employers’ associations) are also excluded from the Commission’s definition of interest representations. However, when such actors engage in activities exceeding the role conferred on them by the Treaties, they are asked to register in order to guarantee a level playing field between all the interests represented.

The Commission’s register has been criticised to be purely voluntary, and not to include meaningful financial data or the names of individual lobbyists. However, the register was told from the beginning to serve as a testing ground for the feasibility of a mandatory register common to all EU institutions - Commission, Parliament and Council.

To some extent the Commission’s register represents a challenge to lobbyists’ reputations as it is up to them to show that they have got nothing to hide. Lobbyists wishing to register must also either sign up to the Commission’s ‘Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives’ or abide by their own equivalent lobbyists code with identical or more stringent requirements. In return for fulfilling these criteria, registered lobbyists receive alerts from the EU executive giving details of upcoming public consultations on policy areas of interest to them.

The efficiency of the Commission’s register is, however, questionable - in 2010 some 60% of lobby groups in Brussels have still not entered their names on the voluntary register; many lobbyists have indicated they will not register because they would have to reveal their clients and their income, giving their competitors who don’t register an unfair advantage (ALTER-EU Survey, Brussels, 22 March 2010).

In 2010 there are 286 groups that offer EU lobbying expertise and services. Of these, only 112 are listed in the Commission’s voluntary register. 104 of the 174 missing from the Commission’s list were, however, fully accredited at the mandatory Parliament register (ALTER-EU Survey, Brussels, 22 March 2010).

*One may conclude that the voluntary approach of the Commission has failed and that the EU executive must make a commitment to introduce a mandatory lobby transparency system that enables European citizens to see who is influencing EU decision-making, on which issues, on whose behalf and with what budgets. Nevertheless, in the view of Commissioner Siim Kallas, acting at that time under the Administration and Anti-Fraud portfolio and the initiator of the European Transparency Initiative, ‘a voluntary approach is much better than a mandatory one, because it offers an incentive to join’.*

Finally, a recent report that takes a deeper and wider look at the attitudes of regulators and policy-makers across Europe towards lobbying shows that the decisions of senior EU officials are more influenced by colleagues, staff, personal research and other EU institutions than interest representation from industry or NGO’s. The report points out as well that many organizations – including public affairs consultancies – fare badly in terms of perceived transparency (Burson-Marsteller 2009).

Lobbying has thus a mixed perception among policy-makers in Europe – on one side there are positive aspects, mainly providing constructive input to decision-

making and sharing of expertise, but on the other side negative aspects persist such as a lack of transparency, despite the Commission's regulatory efforts to address this problem through the European Transparent Initiative. However, the same report (Burson-Marsteller 2009) finds out that the lack of transparency is considered a lot less problematic at the EU level compared to the national level

## From One to Many: The Very Gradual Norwegian Involvement with the EU

The interest of Norwegian NGOs to follow the development in the European Economic Community in the 1960s was rather limited. This changed somewhat with the start of the membership negotiations in 1971 and at least at that time the Norwegian Trade Union Congress had representatives in Brussels with the aim to follow more closely the negotiations and EU policies relevant for their area (Sanden, Appendix 1). This was also the case for N.A.F. (Norsk Arbeidsgiverforening – Norwegian Employers' Association), which functioned both as an employer association and a business association.

In the 1972 referendum on Norwegian membership of the EC, 53.5% voted 'no' despite the economic incentives to join (the export dependence of Norway on the Community has steadily increased – in 1973 47.4% of all exports were addressed to the EU, and in 1992 this amount reached 66.4%). Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, while instead of accession Norway established a bilateral free trade agreement to secure Norwegian export interests with the EC (Eliassen and Sitter 2004). Between 1973 and 1984, the bilateral free trade agreement gradually eliminated tariffs on industrial goods.

In Norway the interests tied to the most important industry, oil and gas, were inconsequential in the membership issue, while sectors such as fishing and farming mattered. The petroleum sector did not actively lobby for membership, but rather provided the revenues, which allowed the state to dole out subsidies to agriculture, which in turn enabled them to campaign against accession. Some authors argue that the reason for Norway to reject EU membership in 1972 as well as in 1994 was that the peasants and fishermen were able to present themselves as the embodiment of the nation. This 'hidden' impact of national identities on integration policies might be essential for explaining a long-term and persistent pattern of rejection of supranational integration (Gstöhl 2002). Or one

could argue that it represents a more cultural centre – periphery dimension which made Norwegians reluctant to accept European urban culture or the domination of a supra national authority.

In 1973 N.A.F. became the first Norwegian interest organisation to be established in Brussels with the aim to follow the negotiations for a free trade agreement. The Association was also member of the European Employers Federation (UNICE) and worked with EC matters to a large extent through UNICE. In 1989 N.A.F. merged with Norsk Industriforbund (Norwegian Industry Association) to form NHO (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon – the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise). Norsk Industriforbund did not previously have had any independent representation in Brussels.

A very important part of the European strategy from the employers' side has always been the membership of UNICE, today BUSINESSEUROPE, which was established in 1958 to track the political consequences of the community created by the Treaty of Rome. At present NHO is a full member of this organisation and actively uses its membership both to get information and to influence EU decisions. To some extent, both NHO and LO (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) are better integrated in the EU decision-making system than the Norwegian government.

Even though N.A.F. established a Brussels office in 1973, LO, who was active in the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) during the 1970s and more active in the 1980s, established a Brussels office only in 1991. Trade interests and the general coordination of the restructuring of Norwegian industrial interests were in the early years of the European Economic Community handled mainly through the Norwegian interest organisations' membership of the European trade federations or through the Norwegian Mission to the EU.

Two important Norwegian industries, which extensively used this channel for policy coordination and influence, were according to Knut Almestad (at that time at the Norwegian Mission to the EU in Brussels) the paper industry and the electro-metallurgical industry (Almestad, Appendix 1). These direct and indirect contacts through the European federations were dominant channels for the Norwegian trade organisations in the 1970s and long into the 1980s.

European federations are an interesting example of a different path of trying to get information and influ-

ence, which even today seems to be an alternative to establish presence in Brussels. In our survey, of the 28 Norwegian actors who were involved in EU lobbying, a majority reported that the use of European federations is as an important channel for lobbying even today. For some actors, European federations seemed to be the most important one. Only very few (3) organisations reported no or very little use of this channel for lobbying and 3 did not answer.

During the 1980s no Norwegian organisations came to establish a permanent representation in Brussels. The increase in the number of Norwegian interest organisations and companies involved in EU interest representation and lobbying, indicated also by the establishment of offices in Brussels, came first from the mid 1990s with the establishment of the EEA treaty between Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein and the EU member countries, which led to the abolishment of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB). With the signing of the EEA agreement, Norway joined the internal market of the European Union, with an exemption on fish and agricultural goods. The EEA agreement further led to a harmonisation and adaptation of rules concerning, HSE (health, safety and environmental) issues, joint competition directives and directives concerning government subsidies. Cooperation in areas like education, science, environment and culture were also part of this agreement. Furthermore, the EEA countries must follow directives, rules and regulations agreed upon in the EU that affect areas in the EEA agreement.

The EEA agreement implied also the establishment of several new institutions in Brussels in addition to


the Brussels office of EFTA. Firstly, a Joint Committee consisting of the EEA-EFTA states plus the European Commission (representing the EU member states) has been set up with the function of extending relevant EU law to the non-EU members. Secondly, an EEA Council meets twice yearly to govern the overall relationship between the EEA members. Rather than setting up pan-EEA institutions, the activities of the EEA are regulated by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court, which is mirroring the work of the European Commission and European Court of Justice.

The first two organisations to set up an EU office in Brussels after NHO, were LO in 1991 and the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) in 1993. The explicit reason given was the assumed impact of a Norwegian membership in the EU internal market for the trade union movement (Sanden Appendix 1) and the regional level of government.

During the 1990s 4 more Norwegian organisations set up a Brussels' office, namely the law and lobbying firm Kreab (only partly with Norwegian clients) (1993), the company Hydro (1994) and the two interest organisations Bellona (1994) and Actis (1996).

In 1995 Sweden joined the EU because its highly export-dependent and capital-intensive manufacturing sector was lobbying for membership, while Norway stayed out because fishing and farming were threatened and oil revenues made non-membership economically feasible.

**FIGURE 2** The number of Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors in Brussels 1980 – 2010



In Figure 2 we present the number of Norwegian actors with an office in Brussels from 1980 to 2010. This shows that the rapid increase in the representation in Brussels came end of the 1990ies after the start of EEA and after the turn of the century.

Today we assume that there exist in total 22 Norwegian non-governmental organisations with an office in Brussels.

The development of EU integration and lobbying in Norway was similar but not the same compared to the development of Sweden and Switzerland in the last 20 years. The three countries have over this time expressed different degrees of integration with the EU which are reflected in their current positions: Sweden joined the Union in 1995, Norway remains in the EEA, while Switzerland, which failed to ratify the EEA agreement in 1992, concluded bilateral sectoral agreements with the EU in 1999. There exists few comparative studies of the number of lobby organisations in Brussels from different countries and the definitions employed vary also considerably. A German data base at the University of Bremen has tried to register the number of EU lobby organisations in Brussels (Wonka 2011). Their data shows that Sweden and in particular Switzerland have more EU lobby organisations in Brussels than Norway. The highest number we find in Germany, Great Britain and France and with the US as number 4!

One of the persons we interviewed pointed also out that Swiss interest organisations are pretty active; they have often more direct impact when lobbying the EU than Norwegian organisations (Johansen, Appendix 1). As regards Sweden, we can assume that its interest organisations have a much bigger impact on the EU decision-making than the Norwegian interest organizations due to the EU membership of Sweden. Is Norway then less successful in EU lobbying compared to its neighbours and EFTA partners? There exists no systematic evidence to support this assumption, but we will in the next section try to find out at least to what extent and how Norwegian NGOs and companies thinks about the role and importance of the Norwegian non-membership in the EU.

## How Do They Operate and What Resources do They Have?

What are the main purposes for Norwegian non-governmental actors to lobby the European Union institutions and to have an office in Brussels, and what are they actually doing? Additionally, we will investigate

what resources do the actors employ in executing their lobbying activity as well as whether the Norwegian non-membership has an impact on them and the importance of the EU institutions and different DGs within the European Commission. In order to answer these and other related questions, we will base parts of our analysis on results from our questionnaire to the Norwegian actors and on interviews with representatives of some of the organisations and Norwegian authorities.

As regards to our methodology, we first established a list of companies and interest organisations which either had established an office in Brussels or informants indicated had been active in lobbying EU institutions and decision-making. Nonetheless, some of these organisations responded to us that they were not lobbying the EU, for example law firms with offices in Brussels. The resulting list of interest organisations and companies encompassed in total 40 Norwegian actors, including both those with an office in Brussels and those operating from Norway. Secondly, we prepared a comprehensive questionnaire which was answered by 28 of the 40 organisations (the name of the respondents are shown in the following figure 3). As mentioned earlier in this report, the respondents include 12 interest organisations, 6 regional offices, 7 Norwegian companies and 3 lobbying companies. In questions where the participants were asked to rate their interests, a scale from 0-5 where used, in which 0 represents 'no relevance' while 5 represents 'very relevant'.

To generalize our findings we will present the mean of the Norwegian organisations responses, but also give certain specific examples of answers given as a free text. The questionnaire in its entirety, part I-III, can be found in Appendix 2.

**FIGURE 3** List of organisations participating in the survey

<b>Interest Organisations</b>	
Actis Rusfeltets samarbeidsorgan	Actis
Miljøstiftelsen Bellona	The Bellona Foundation
Energi Norge	Energy Norway
Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens landsforening (FHL)	Norwegian Seafood Federation
Intertanko -The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners	Intertanko -The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
KS - Kommunesektorens interesse- og arbeidsgiverorganisasjon	Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities
Landsorganisasjonen – LO	The Confederation of Norwegian Trade Unions
Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon (NHO)	Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO)
NHO mat og drikke	Federation of Norwegian Food and Drink Industry
Norsk Bondelag	Norwegian Farmers Union
Norsk Industri	Federation of Norwegian Industry
Nordsjøkommisjonen	North Sea Commission
<b>Norwegian Companies</b>	
Agder Energi	Agder Energy
Det Norske Veritas (DNV)	Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
Hydro	Hydro (Hydro Coporate EU Office)
Statkraft AS	Statkraft AS
Statoil EU Affairs Office	Statoil EU Affairs Office
Telenor ASA	Telenor Representative Office in Brussels
Yara International ASA	Yara International ASA
<b>Norwegian Law and lobbying Firms</b>	
1-Tech	1-Tech
Kreab Gavin Anderson	Kreab Gavin Anderson
Brusselkontoret AS	The Brussels Office
<b>Regional Representations</b>	
Østlandssamarbeidet	Eastern Norway County Network
Midt-Norges Europakontor	Mid-Norway European Office
Osloregionens Europakontor	Oslo Region European Office
Sør-Norges Europakontor	South Norway European Office
Stavanger-regionens Europakontor og One Market sprl	Stavanger Region
Vest-Norges Brussel kontor	West Norway European Office

First of all, working actively towards EU institutions and decision-making processes implies that the organisation or the company should be registered in the two lobby registers in Brussels. Our interviewees indicated that Norwegian actors are strongly in favour of better control on lobbying in Brussels. However, only 50 percent (14 of 28) of the Norwegian non-governmental actors had registered in the parliamentary register. The same holds true for the European Commission register

with 12 out of 28, or 43 percent. Both figures are lower than one could expect from Norwegian non-governmental organisations strongly in favour of transparency. Some company representatives argued, nonetheless, in the interviews that even if they had registered, they felt that it was difficult to give a proper image of their activities towards the EU due to the way the European Commission register is constructed. The way various companies from the same industry present their

EU lobbying activities in the register differs therefore substantially.

Norwegian non-governmental lobbyists view EU legislation and decisions in general as being of importance to them. It is therefore imperative to be informed about the on-going political process, as well as to gain influence. Direct lobbying of EU institutions might also be more important for Norwegian actors than for organisations and companies from member states, which have several other channels of information and influence inside the institutions as well as in member states. A majority of the persons we interviewed expressed views supporting such a statement. On the other hand, there are difficulties in finding indications that Norwegian actors are overrepresented in EU lobbying compared to Member States non-governmental organisations. One conclusion could be that they feel the need, but still don't do more than actors from other nations!

EU policies are of major importance for the interests and activities of all our different categories of actors on behalf of their members and clients. The most obvious is the result for the lobbying firms (5 on a scale from 1 – 5)! Least importance, 4.17, is registered for the regional organisations. An explanation for this might be that they are often represented in Brussels also for other reasons than just EU lobbying, e.g. EU funding, networking with other regions etc.

It also seems reasonable that those organisations that have chosen to carry the costs of establishing an office in Brussels view EU activities as more important than those organisations operating from home. This, however, seems not to be the case. There are no systematic differences between those with or without a representation in Brussels. Having an office in Brussels seems to be more linked to their *modus operandi* and the resources they command than the perceived direct relevance of EU policies.

The large majority of non-governmental actors in our study are most likely lobbying the EU on behalf of themselves or their members. They are either membership based organisations or major companies. Few of the companies included in our survey are professional lobbying firms. The reasons for this is partly that some Norwegian actors in Brussels operating on behalf of various clients like law firms and accounting firms have explicitly rejected to label what they are doing as EU lobbying. This could also be seen as in line with the reasoning of the European Commission who doesn't label them as lobbyists – even if they also do lobby-

ing. In other cases, Norwegian actors use international and/or European lobbying firms in which the Norwegian clients constitute only a minor part of their total number of clients. Thus, the three lobbying organisations we have covered in this study are a somewhat mixed sample of lobbying organisations: one technology firm, one international lobbying firm and one lobbying firm with a majority of Norwegian clients.

However, it is interesting to note that in addition to the lobbying firms included in the analysis, two companies are lobbying on behalf of their customers as well as for themselves, and some regional representatives are also to some extent lobbying on behalf of clients. Regional representatives' definition of 'members' and 'clients' depends on the way they organise their offices and their links with different regional interests. Some of them are owned by municipalities and counties, others by associations of municipalities and counties representing their "members" and others again by municipalities and counties and hospitals, universities etc. representing both their members and others in the region as "clients".

#### **What do the different actors do when they are "lobbying"?**

As mentioned, we use the term 'lobbying' in a very wide sense. "Influencing" could therefore be assumed to account for only a minor part of the total activity of the Norwegian non-governmental actors towards the EU system. This is supported by empirical data. On a scale from 1 to 5, activities aimed at influencing the policy outcome get a score of 2.93 compared to 3.71 for activities to gather information. However, the difference is perhaps smaller than previous studies have assumed when they advocate that influencing constitutes only a minor part of lobbyists' activity (Andersen and Eliassen 2003).

If we look at what actors see as the main purpose of their activities, information gathering representation of their interests towards EU decision-makers and influencing decision-making, are topping the list – respectively 4.71, 4.25 and 4.23 on a scale from 1 to 5. That so many view the ability to influence as a central task is impressive. The high level of influencing as a purpose for their work is again remarkable, when we know from other studies how little actual influencing activities non-governmental actors are doing compared to information gathering.

Less salient, but still important, tasks for lobbyists are representation of their interests towards other players on the EU scene (4.11); building ties with EU institutions (3.86); increasing general awareness about

their own existence and interests (3.39); and gathering information about EU funding opportunities (2.89). Interestingly, regional representations see information gathering about EU funding as more important (4.33) than influencing the EU decision-making (3.33). There could be some problems of the definition of their intentions here, but still the result is remarkable. Do the Norwegian actors need to focus more on the influencing aspect than similar actors coming from EU Member States?

When we look at the methods used for information gathering and influencing, we find that the actors mainly utilise documents, meetings with different actors, and the Internet. The difference in importance between these three sources is small (from 3.67 to 4.00).


According to literature, the main point of influence historically has been the early stages of policy shaping in the Commission (Andersen and Eliassen 2003). This tendency is confirmed also for the Norwegian actors. All of the respondents point out that they are involved in this first phase of the EU decision-making process. Fewer of them are involved in the next phases until the parliamentary phase, where the key element for influence is the deliberation in the relevant parliamentary committee. The increased role of the parliament has

made this phase a new important possibility for influencing by interest organisations, companies and law firms. This result is also confirmed in our interviews.

The next issue is the relative importance of the different EU institutions and different Directorates-General in the European Commission for Norwegian non-governmental actors. The priorities of Norwegian non-governmental actors could be different from similar actors from Member States since they perhaps will have other priorities given their more comprehensive involvement with the EU. Several of our questions are aimed at ranking the role and importance of the various institutions and DGs.

By far the most important target institution for all types of Norwegian actors is still the European Commission (4.80). The second most important institution is, unsurprisingly, the European Parliament (3.88). Generally, all different types of lobbyists attach similar importance to these two institutions. The third most important institution to lobby, according to our respondents, is the Council of Ministers (2.55). One should note that there is a huge difference between the importance of the Council for the Norwegian lobbying firms (4.50) compared to the Regional representations (1.00).


**FIGURE 4** The most Important Institutions to Target for the Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors




There are substantial differences between the perceived importance and relevance of the different DGs for Norwegian actors. The most important ones are Energy, Climate Action, Transport, Environment, Competition, Internal Market, Industry, Research and Digital Agenda, in this sequence (see Figure 5). All of them are close to either core Norwegian policy areas or those where Norway is very closely involved with the EU like Internal Market and Research.

We also find substantial differences between the perceived importances of different Parliamentary (EP) committees for Norwegian non-governmental organisations. The four most important committees are (ranked) the Industry, Research and Energy committee, the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee, the Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee, and the Transport and Tourism committee, see Figure 6.

**FIGURE 5** The Importance of the Different DGs for the Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors



**FIGURE 6** The Importance of Different Committees in the European Parliament for the Norwegian Non-Governmental Actors



### Resources of Non-Governmental actors

What kind of resources do the different Norwegian non-governmental actors command in order to lobby these different institutions? In our questionnaire we have focused on four aspects in this regard, mainly aimed at the organisations with an office in Brussels. For organisations operating from Norway, it is more difficult to separate resources for EU lobbying from resources used for other purposes at home. For those in Brussels our focus is on budget, staff, office and the use of external consultants. For management staff we focus on their number, competencies and nationality. For the 7 organisations operating out of Norway, we only have figures for the staff working with EU affairs.

In our analysis we find that the average number of employees in the organisations with a Brussels office is 3.6 (excluding the large international consultancy firm in the sample with several Norwegian clients). For the organisations working out of Norway, the comparable figure is 2.33 (excluding a large company). For those in Brussels it is also notable that, with the exception of the administrative staff, all other staff members

Another issue is the nationality of the staff members in the offices in Brussels. A majority of our interviewees argued in favour of multi-national staff and emphasised the importance of recruiting employees from member states – partly to compensate for the restricted number of potential Norwegian contacts in the different institutions. However, some argue that Norwegian staff enhances the link with the home organisation. We believe that the evidence, particularly from some of the most successful Nordic lobbyists in Brussels, supports the argument of the advantages of a multi-national staff. In our survey we find that on the average, more than half of the staff, 2.18 out of 3.6, were other nationalities.


In addition to their own staff in Brussels, the actors would also hire professional consultants and lobbyists to increase their lobby capacity. Responding to a question of how important this possibility is, the respondents rated this at 1.92 on a scale from 1 – 5. An often used activity both to get more information and also to inform decision-makers in Brussels about a specific issue is to arrange seminars. Among the Norwegian

organisations in Brussels this received a rating of 3.19. We tried also to register their budgetary resources, but only 12 answered these questions. It is also not so easy to compare budgetary resources across very different organisations. For the organisations operating out of Norway there was even fewer answering and the uncertainty in using these data is even greater. For the Brussels-based organisations, we find that only three have a staff budget of over 500 000 euro, 2 between 200 000 and 500 000 and the rest lower than 200 000. For office rent, all with the exception of 3 pay rent of less than 100 000 euro. And for all other activities only one has a budget of more than 200 000 euro. Thus, the budget and also the staff information indicate that the Norwegian lobbying organisations are, with a few exceptions, small offices with rather limited resources compared to the volume and complexity of the activities going on in Brussels.

The Norwegian non-governmental actors were also asked how they rate the importance of different types

of attitudes and activities for successful lobbying. Interestingly, however, the importance of budgetary resources and size of staff are of the lowest importance among the respondents. The most important factor, reported by all groups, was to have continuity and a long-term perspective for EU lobbying (4.56). This reflects findings from most studies of EU lobbying. To have continuity in the representation and preferably from a Brussels office seems to be of crucial importance for success. This was also underlined among several of the persons we were interviewing. The second most frequently mentioned resources for getting results in their lobbying activities were employing staff with long experience in dealing with the EU and EU lobbying (4.40) and coordinating lobby activities with other interest organisations (4.35) The important elements of successful lobbying are EU focus and competence (see figure 7). The interesting question is, however, to what extent resources matter and how they eventually transform into lobbying success. This will be discussed at the end of the next section.

**FIGURE 7** Important factors for successful lobbying



So far we have discussed the involvement of Norwegian non-governmental organisations in EU lobbying mainly related to the law-making process. As we have seen from the studies of EU lobbying, Brussels has been the focal point for a lot of other activities as well, such as fundraising and contact with other organisations and companies. The function of Brussels as the “capital of Europe” has become increasingly important. Most other actors relevant for a Norwegian organisation or company are represented in Brussels. This includes facilitates networking, setting up meetings and developing projects not necessary linked to the EU institutions.

Gathering information, influencing and participating in EU-funded projects are important for all Norwegian non-governmental actors in Brussels. The funding per se is not necessarily the most important, rather, getting contacts, finding partners and developing new projects for their member organisations or the company at home. Nearly all Norwegian non-governmental actors have in one way or another been involved in EU funded projects either directly or indirectly by assisting their members to be successful in entering EU projects.

For projects funded by other sources, we find the opposite pattern. Only four out of the 28 actors have reported participation in projects funded by other sources like UN funding, EEA Financial Mechanism or national sources even if the competence and technology needed for non-EU projects are to some extent similar as for developing EU projects. We conclude from this that the aim of being in Brussels or going to Brussels is EU funding. Funding for project from other sources internationally and from other countries is not so frequently done from Brussels.

Some Norwegian organisations and companies (for example Telenor), also see Brussels and the EU institutions as a way of influencing other international organisations and also to use the EU to influence member states governments or other governments.

Norwegian actors are not only lobbying in the preparation phase of the decisions, but also trying to influence the implementation of EU directives in EFTA countries and trying to find out how this legislation is implemented in member states. This is particularly important for some interest organisations and companies, mainly those who are directly involved with implementation in Norway. For the organisation for Norwegian municipalities and counties (KS), EFTA is of crucial importance since their members are in

charge of the implementation of EEA directives in Norway. They are mainly advocating the interests of an efficient and correct implementation and not some sector specific interest. Therefore the Norwegian governmental institutions, both in Brussels (the Mission) and in Oslo, are more important to them than to other Norwegian interest organisations and companies.

Lobbying in Brussels has historically been directed towards the making of directives, regulations and EU decisions, in fields such as research, health and education. In recent years we have seen a substantial increase in the use of the Open Method of Coordination, or “soft law” in areas where the EU has limited or no competence, (such as health and education), or where laws are not a relevant policy-making tool (e.g. competitiveness and employment). This development represents a fundamental new challenge for lobbying in general and for Norwegian actors in particular, as the decisions are eventually taken in the capitals of the 27 member states and not by EU institutions in Brussels. One can assume that this development will require substantial changes in how to lobby for Norwegian interests. Let us now, however, turn to the more challenging efforts of Norwegian non-governmental actors practising complex lobbying indirectly through different channels.

## Complex Lobbying And Influence – How Do They Coordinate with Other Actors?

This section tries to map the more complex pattern of information gathering and influence, not only by what the actors do themselves directly through EU institutions, but also the interplay with different types of actors in Brussels and at home. How important are these other types of actors for different types of lobby organisations? Focus is both on other organisations and European federations and also on national governments and national representations in Brussels.

When asked to rank the importance of factors enhancing success in lobbying efforts, our respondents emphasised coordination with other European organisations/companies with similar interests, in addition to continuity and a long-term perspective as discussed above. Our interviewees confirmed this result: coordination with European federations and cooperation with other interest organisations and companies being the strategy most frequently mentioned both in the early period of the 1970s and early 1980s, but also with major importance still today. This is relevant both for business organisations, companies and trade

unions. However, the importance of other Norwegian actors as strategic partners got a rather low rating, only 2.83 on a scale from 1 to 5. Thus, the preferred strategy seems to be to find partners in Europe and on the European level.

### Importance of Norwegian Governmental Institutions

How important are the Norwegian government and the Norwegian Mission to the EU for the different non-governmental actors in Brussels? For Norwegian non-governmental actors with an office in Brussels, the Norwegian government is more important than the Norwegian Mission (3.29) compared to 2.38). Commercial companies rate the importance of the Mission at a mere 2.00, whereas the score for interest organisations is 3.17, and for regional offices, 3.60. Thus, the mission is in general not very important for Norwegian non-governmental actors, but more important for the regions than for interest organisations and especially business. The Norwegian Mission and Norwegian governmental actors in general tend also to be more important in situations with a high conflict level between Norway and the relevant EU institutions.

Our interviews also show that the Mission is rather irrelevant for many Norwegian actors in Brussels, even for information gathering. This is confirmed in our questionnaire. The importance of meetings with Norwegian governmental representatives is substantially lower than for all other channels the actors employ, with a score of 2.85 (as opposed to from 3.67 to 3.82 for other channels). Most of the interest organisations tend to get their information through their European federations or sister organisations in the member states, and often tend to be better informed than the representatives at the Norwegian Mission as indicated in several of our interviews. Moreover, they are often getting the information earlier. Another indication that the Mission is of little relevance is that few of Norwegian interest organisations represented in Brussels would like to move their office to the Norwegian House. Both NHO, LO and KS are located in buildings together with European sister organisations and/or European federations.

Our data confirms what we have discussed above, namely that the most important ways of influencing decisions is directly by arranging meetings (4.12) and indirectly through European umbrella associations (4.15). Here the use of the Norwegian Mission (2.88) and Norwegian state institutions (2.63) is also low compared to other types of channels. Regarding companies, we find the same pattern, only even more pronounced. Big companies have their own channels

of influence, both through their European organisations and through daughter companies in Member States. Moreover, non-governmental actors can also some times lobby “on behalf” of the Norwegian government – they are often active inside parts of the EU decision-making system not open to representatives from the Norwegian government.

One question we could further ask, but which is difficult to answer is whether Norwegian organisations need more resources to be influential than a company or interest organisation from a member state. Both our interviews and our data indicate that many of the organisations feel that they need additional resources to gain influence in the EU as an organisation coming from the outside, or to use their European federations or member organisations or daughter companies in member states to exercise influence. Coming from a non-member state seems to be a disadvantage if the goal is to influence EU decision-making.

One of the reasons for this, as stated in many of the interviews, is that Norwegians’ contact network inside the EU institutions is much more restricted than for organisations from member states. As one interest organisation argued, the Swedes have more than 500 Swedish nationals working in the EU institutions, which they can contact. Norway has only a handful of experts in some parts of the EU where we are full member, such as research, and some tens of national experts in the commission. We have no access to the decision-making process after the initial stages of decision shaping in the Commission when it comes to EEA issues and no access at all in other areas - with a few exceptions like the Schengen cooperation.

### Importance and use of EFTA

To what extent is the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) an important channel for Norwegian non-governmental actors lobbying EU institutions? Our questionnaire and interviews indicate that EFTA is not very important. The average rating is 2.68, and when excluding KS and the regional representations (who need EFTA in their members’ work with implementation), the rating is even lower, 2.40.

It seems reasonable to assume that most Norwegian interest groups interested in the EEA would need to get information from and/or try to influence EFTA and EEA institutions like the ESA. We have asked all the Norwegian actors in Brussels about how often they have contacts with EFTA and the ESA, and on average the responses rate EFTA at 2.38 and ESA at 2.59 in a scale from 1 to 5 (in comparison, the equiva-

lent score for the Commission, which has the highest score is 3.68). In addition to the relatively low score of EFTA, only 19 say that they at all use EFTA or ESA for this purpose. One important reason for the low importance of the EFTA link is the total lack of EFTA involvement in the decision-making phase. The EFTA members of the EEA are only involved in the decision-shaping phase, which is the important basic democratic problem of the EEA treaty.

When we look at which institutions lobbyists actually have regular contact with, EFTA and the ESA score lower than the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. Again, the European Commission gets the highest score (3.68), followed by the Parliament (2.60), EFTA (2.38) and the ESA (2.59). However, for the latter two there are substantial differences between the actors, with companies attaching only very limited importance to them (1.50 for EFTA and 1.40 for the ESA).

Then what about the Nordic dimension in Brussels? It is a clear impression from our interviews that Nordic member states were often not fully trusted or seen as an optimal channel for Norwegian influence. At least, this is the case for many issues where Norway and Nordic member countries have diverging interests. Still, some of the persons we interviewed told that the Norwegian Ministry of Environment previously have had a representative in the Swedish ministry. Nordic cooperation among organisations is important for some organisations (for example trade unions), but this is more an exception than a rule.

Finally we will try to investigate how successful the Norwegian non-governmental actors are, given all the lobbying activities they are involved in, the resources they have and the basic aim they have of influencing the EU.

### **Influence of the Non-Governmental actors**

To what extent are the Norwegian non-governmental actors successful in their lobbying of the EU? Success is measured first and foremost in relation to influence, but also in pursuing the other aims of the organisations such as information gathering and representing their organisation - which they also point out as important. Influence is in general difficult to measure and in particular when we only have data from the organisations themselves and some assessments during interviews with some well placed actors on the European scene. We will mainly focus on their own assessment of lobbying capabilities and influence and their evaluation of what they need and eventually could do better.

The Norwegian non-governmental actors in Brussels have a rather optimistic view in general on how good and efficient they are in influencing the EU, with an average score of 3.63 out of 5. The most efficient in their own view are the lobbying firms (4.33) and the least optimistic in their own assessment are the companies with 3.29. Among only those with an office in Brussels we find more or less the same pattern of feeling of own efficiency. Presence in Brussels seems not to have a measurable effect on how efficient they find themselves. We also asked if they have any shortcomings in their EU lobbying activities. The answers were somewhat mixed, but only 8 felt that they had difficulties in their lobbying activities. We also have some examples on their own assessments of success in influencing the EU decisions.

In the survey we moreover asked the different actors to mention some of their success stories regarding influencing the EU decision-making process. In figure 8 we have presented some of these success stories the different actors mentioned.

### **FIGURE 8** Examples of Norwegian Non-Governmental Lobbying Successes

- Launching of new energy research priorities and implementing new major projects
- Supporting the global strategy on Alcohol and Pregnancy. Lobbying for the new strategy on blood alcohol levels, now below 0,5 in most MS
- Lobbying related to the EU CCS directive (Carbon Capture and Storage)
- Commenting reports from the European Parliament, comments and views seen adopted in documents from the Commission
- Obtained a 6 months in-phasing period for low-sulphur fuel ports due to expert advice provided to the Commission/Comitology in last minute decision making.
- Got rid of anti-dumping measures against farmed trout and farmed Atlantic salmon from Norway
- Emissions trading scheme - recognition of CO2 impacts on power prices, risk of carbon leakage
- Influenced Roaming regulation adopted in 2009 – the organisation's intervention was the basis for

specific considerations by the EC and EP, which resulted in a positive manner for the organisation.

- Contact with the EC officials has led to concrete results in 3rd country markets where unfavourable legislation have been moderated under pressure from the EU.
- Working time directive and service directive

## EU Lobbying and the Norway – EU Relationship: Some Conclusions

In this final section we will sum up our main findings and discuss the results from this report in the context of the special characteristics of the relationship between Norway and the EU.

We have in this report analysed Norwegian non-governmental interest representation and lobbying towards the EU. Non-governmental actors are interest organisations, regional offices, Norwegian companies and lobbying firms. Out of the 40 we identified, 28 organisations responded to our questionnaire. The focus has been on their EU lobbying defined in a rather wide and comprehensive manner, covering everything from gathering information to trying to influence EU decision-making. Gathering information is the most dominant activity in EU lobbying and most non-governmental organisations are strictly speaking not very often engaged in influencing EU decisions.

Both our questionnaire and our interviews indicate, however, that Norwegian actors see influencing EU decisions as more important, both in terms of purpose and time spent, than has often been assumed in the literature on lobbying, where information gathering and dissemination traditionally has played a larger role. This report has discussed whether this could be linked to the fact that Norway is not an EU member and thus our organisations will not have the same access to other channels of influence through home country governments or nationals from their own country working in the different EU institutions.

Permanent presence in Brussels is often seen as of major asset for involvement in all aspects of EU lobbying. In our material, 22 of the 40 non-governmental organisations we identified had an office in Brussels and 21 of them responded to our questionnaire. The first organisation to set up an office in Brussels was NHO in 1973, the next two organisations were LO in 1991 and the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional

Authorities (KS) in 1993. The reason for their interest was the assumed impact of a Norwegian membership in the EU internal market. During the first part of the 1990s four more Norwegian organisations set up a Brussels office, but the rapid increase in the representation in Brussels came after the EEA was established in 1994 and after 2000. Today both Sweden and in particular Switzerland has many more lobby organisations in Brussels than Norway, and they are also very active.

All categories of Norwegian non-governmental actors reported that EU policies were of major importance for them and their members, although regional offices reported somewhat less importance. This could be explained by the fact that they might be represented in Brussels for other reasons as well, like representing the region, access to EU funds etc.

The large majority in our study are lobbying the EU on behalf of their members or themselves. The few lobbying firms included in the study obviously lobby on behalf of their clients and this is also the case for some regional representation and companies. Some law firms and accounting firms represented in Brussels explicitly rejected characterising their activities as lobbying and would not take part in the study.

Regarding registration in lobby registers in Brussels, only 50 percent of the Norwegian non-governmental actors had registered in the European Parliament's register and for the European Commission's register the number is 43 percent. Both figures are lower than one could expect from Norwegian non-governmental organisations strongly in favour of transparency.

What are these organisations doing towards the EU? Information gathering is the most important activity of EU lobby organisations, rated at 3.71 compared to 2.93 for activities aimed at influencing decisions. This is perhaps a smaller difference than we expected, given that existing literature would lead us to assume the information aspect much more important relative to influencing. When we focus on what the actors see as the main purpose of their activities, information gathering and influencing are placed even closer in importance, 4.71 and 4.23 respectively. Influencing as such an important purpose for their work is again remarkable, when we know from other studies how little actual influencing activities non-governmental actors are doing compared to information gathering

By far the most important target institution for all types of Norwegian actors is the European Commission (4.80) followed by the European Parliament

(3.88). The importance of the Commission is also closely linked to the fact that all actors see the early stages of policy shaping as the most important stage to try to influence. The most important DGs are Energy, Climate Action, Transport, Environment, Competition, Internal Market, Industry, Research and Digital Agenda -- all of them are close to either core Norwegian policy areas or those sectors where Norway is very closely involved with the EU. There are also substantial differences between the perceived importance of the different European Parliament committees, the four most important committees are: Industry, Research and Energy; Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; Internal Market and Consumer Protection; and Transport and Tourism.

In order to become successful in EU lobbying, the actors were not prioritising budget and staff, but rather having a long-term perspective and continuity in their work. The average ranking was 4.56. Also among the interviewees this was enhanced as being of crucial importance for success. This is underlined with the second most important factor being to hire staff with long experience in dealing with EU and EU lobbying.

Coordination with other European organisations/companies with similar interests was also top on the agenda for successful lobbying both in the 1970s, the 1980s and today. The most important way of influencing decisions is indirectly through European umbrella associations (4.15). Regarding companies, we find the same pattern more pronounced. Big companies have their own channels of influence, both through their European federations and through daughter companies.

To what extent are they successful? We have few indications of the success of the active Norwegian attempts to influence the EU, but judged by themselves the Norwegian non-governmental actors in Brussels has a rather optimistic view in general on how good and efficient they are in influencing EU. They give themselves an average score of 3.63 out of 5. Eight felt they had difficulties in their lobbying activities.

For some companies it is interesting to be represented in Brussels not only to work with EU institutions and EU governments on EU policies, but also work with foreign (non-EU?) governments and EU institutions regarding interests in other parts of the world. The EU can be a useful partner, with or in addition to the Norwegian government, in putting pressure on governments in other countries where the company operates.

Participating in the EU-funded projects is also an important aspect for all Norwegian non-governmental actors in Brussels. The funding per se is not necessarily the most important, rather, getting contacts, finding partners and developing new projects for their member organisations or the company at home.

Investigating the role of the EFTA and Norwegian institutions for Norwegian non-governmental actors, we find that EFTA is not a very important channel for EU lobbying (2.38) and the same for ESA (2.59). There are, however, substantial differences between the actors, with companies attaching only very limited importance to them (1.50 for EFTA and 1.40 for the ESA). The Norwegian actors report that they have more contact with the Commission than with EFTA, and one important reason for the low importance is the total lack of EFTA involvement in the decision-making phase. The EFTA members of the EEA are only involved on the decision-shaping phase. Some Norwegian actors are not only lobbying in the preparation phase of the decision, but also trying to influence the implementation of EU directives in EFTA countries and to find out how this legislation is implemented in Member States. Especially for the organisation for the municipalities and counties (KS) and the regional representations, EFTA is of importance since their members are in charge of the implementation of EEA directives in Norway.

Regarding the Nordic dimension we find that Nordic member states were often not fully trusted or seen as an optimal channel for Norwegian influence. At least, this is the case for many issues where Norway and Nordic member countries have diverging interests. Nordic cooperation is, however, important for some organisations (for example trade unions), but this is more an exception than a rule.

Most of our interviewees considered The Norwegian Mission to the EU to be of limited importance under normal conditions. The organisations and the companies had their own – and often more valuable – contacts in the EU system. Through European organisations and federations of which they are members, they also have more direct access to EU decision-making. However, in case of major problems with the EU or crises in a certain sector, the Norwegian Mission and the Norwegian government are more important, as was the case even back in the 1980s.

Our interviews also showed that the Mission is rather irrelevant for many Norwegian actors in Brussels, even for information gathering. Most of the interest or-

organisations tend to get their information through their European federations or sister organisations in the member states, and to be better informed than the representatives at the Norwegian Mission. Moreover, they are often getting the information earlier. Some actors felt that they had more to tell the relevant counsellors at the mission, than the other way around. This pattern goes also to some extent for the relevant Ministries at home.

For Norwegian non-governmental actors with an office in Brussels, the Norwegian government is more important than the Norwegian Mission (3.29 compared to 2.38). Commercial companies rate the importance of the Mission at a mere 2.00, whereas the score for interest organisations is 3.17, and for regional offices, 3.60. Thus, the mission is in general not very important for Norwegian non-governmental actors, but more important for the regions than for interest organisations and especially business.

Another indication that the Mission is of little relevance is that few of Norwegian interest organisations represented in Brussels would like to move their office to the Norwegian House. Both NHO, LO and KS are located in buildings together with European sister organisations and/or European federations.

Our data confirm what we have discussed above, namely that the most important ways of influencing decisions is directly by arranging meetings (4.12) and indirectly through European umbrella associations (4.15). Here the use of the Norwegian Mission (2.88) and Norwegian state institutions (2.63) is also low compared to other types of channels. Regarding companies, we find the same pattern, only even more pronounced. Moreover, non-governmental actors can lobby on behalf of the Norwegian government – they often are inside parts of the EU decision-making system not open to Norwegian government.

What we have discovered in this study is linked to the basic structure of the relationship between Norway and the EU, and the particular characteristics of the EEA treaty could explain some of our findings. In total 19 of 28 respondents said that the Norwegian non-membership of the EU was a drawback in their lobbying efforts. Those who disagreed with this statement were mainly regional organisations, interest organisations with strong links to sister organisations in member states or a few companies with daughter companies in member states.

We discussed also whether Norwegian organisations

need more resources to be influential, than a company or interest organisation from a member state. Both our interviews and our data indicate that many of the organisations feel that they need additional resources to gain influence in the EU as an organisation coming from the outside, or they had to use their European federations, member organisations or daughter companies in member states to exercise influence. Coming from a non-member state is thus a definite disadvantage if the goal is to influence EU decision-making. One of the reasons for this, as stated in many of the interviews, is that Norwegians' contact network inside the EU institutions is much more restricted than for organisations from member states and they have no access to the decision-making process after the initial stages of decision shaping in the Commission when it comes to EEA issues and no access at all in other areas - with a few exceptions like the Schengen cooperation.

As a conclusion our study shows that a majority of the actors involved in EU lobbying find that the Norwegian relation to the EU through the EEA treaty and several other treaties and institutional arrangements instead of full membership place some important restrictions on their ability to lobby the EU institutions. These limitations are compared to Sweden, first and foremost linked to the lack of Norwegian representatives in the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, the lack of Norwegian nationals in all the different EU institutions which the actors could contact and the inability of Norway to build over time a basic understanding of Norwegian core interests in the different parts of the decision-making system.

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## Appendix 1

### List of Interviews Conducted for t

DATE	PLACE	ORGANISATION	PERSON / POSITION	INTERVIEWER(S)
17. August 2010	Restaurant Rue Archimede, Brussels	Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions	Knut Arne Sanden/ Permanente representative	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
19. August 2010	Oslo	ESA	Knut Almestad	Kjell A. Eliassen
10. October 2010	Geneva	The Norwegian Delegation in Geneva / WTO	Elin Østebø Johansen/ Norwegian ambassador	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
20. October 2010	Brussels	Statoil	Geir Westgaard/ Head of office	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
21. October 2010	Brussels	The Brussels Office	Helene Tofte/ Managing Director	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
21. October 2010	Brussels	Bellona Office	Paal Frisvold/ Director	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
21. October 2010	Brussels	Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (NHO)	Trine Radmann/ Director	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
21. October 2010	Brussels	Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS)	Åse Erdahl/ Director	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
2. November 2010	Brussels	Norsk Hydro	Roxana Lesovici/ Head of Office	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
2. November 2010	Brussels	Telenor	Lotte Abildgaard/ Head of Office	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva
19. November 2010	Paris	The Norwegian Embassy in Paris	Tharald Brautaset/ Ambassador in Paris	Kjell A. Eliassen Pavlina Peneva

## Appendix 2

### PART I - Questions for all respondents

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

#### 1. What is the name of your organisation – in Norwegian and English?

Norwegian:

English:

#### 2. What are the main fields of interest/activities of your organisation?

#### 3. Does your organisation try to lobby the EU for:

Please tick the most relevant answer(s)

> its own interests

> the interests of its members

> the interests of its clients?

#### 4. How does the EU legislation impact the field of interest/activities of your organisation/members/clients?

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

#### 5. When did your organisation started to lobby the EU?

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**6. What is the purpose of the EU lobbying activities of your organisation?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

> Gathering information about EU policies relevant to the interests of your organisation/members/clients:

&gt;&gt;

> Gathering information about EU funding opportunities:

&gt;&gt;

> Building up ties with EU institutions:

&gt;&gt;

> Increasing more generally awareness about your organisation/members/clients:

&gt;&gt;

> Representing the interests of your organisation/members/clients towards EU decision-makers:

&gt;&gt;

> Representing the interests of your organisation/members/clients towards other players at the EU scene:

&gt;&gt;

> Influencing the EU decision-making in the interests of your organisation/members/clients

&gt;&gt;

> Other purposes: (Please specify)

.....

**7. In an average month, how do you divide your time between the following tasks (1: least time – 5: most time)?**

Please rate on a scale from 1(Least Time) to 5 (Most Time)

> Gathering information about the EU :

&gt;&gt;

> Presenting the information about your organisation to actors in Brussels:

&gt;&gt;

> Reporting back to Norway on what is going on in the EU:

&gt;&gt;

> Actively influencing EU decisions:

&gt;&gt;

**8. If your organisation seeks to gather information about the EU, what instruments & methods do you use?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

> Internet:

&gt;&gt;

> Meetings with EU institutions:

&gt;&gt;

> Meetings with your European federation, if any:

&gt;&gt;

> Written documents issued by your European federation, if any:

&gt;&gt;

> Meetings with Norwegian representatives:

&gt;&gt;

> Meetings with other actors:

&gt;&gt;

> Other (Please specify):

.....

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

9. If your organisation seeks to influence the EU decision-making, what are the ways of doing it?  
 Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

**Direct lobbying** through the following channels of communication:

- > Meetings:
- > Phone calls:
- > Emails:
- > Lunches/dinners:
- > DVD, videos:
- > Exhibitions, receptions:
- > Written briefing materials:

**Indirect lobbying** through the following channels of communication:

- > Chamber of commerce:
- > Trade unions:
- > European umbrella associations/federations:
- > Norwegian state institutions:
- > Daughter companies in EU countries:
- > The Norwegian Mission to the EU:

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**10. In general, at what stage does your organisation normally try to influence the EU?**

Please tick the appropriate stage(s) by using the boxes

- |  |                          |
|--|--------------------------|
| > Before the European Commission presents a relevant policy initiative                             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > Immediately after the European Commission presents a relevant policy initiative                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > When the European Parliament has appointed the MEP in charge with the proposed policy initiative | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > Before the report on the dossier is voted in the relevant European Parliament's committee        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > Before the European Parliament votes in plenary sitting  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > At other stages in the EU decision-making process – which ones?                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Please overtype these words

**11. Which of the following EU Institutions are targeted by your lobbying activities?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

- |                                      |                          |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| > The European Commission:           | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > The European Parliament:           | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > The European Council of Ministers: | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > The Committee of the Regions:      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| > The Economic and Social committee: | <input type="checkbox"/> |

**12. Has the importance for your organisation of these different EU institutions changed during the last 10 years and if yes, in which manner?**

Please overtype these words

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**13. If your lobbying activities target the European Commission, which DGs are the most important for the interests of your organisation/members/clients?**

Please rate on a scale from 0 (no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

> Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Trade:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Health and Consumer Policy:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Competition:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Research, Innovation and Science:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Transport:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Financial Programming and Budget:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Digital Agenda:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Maritime affairs and fisheries:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Industry and Entrepreneurship:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Response:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Environment:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Energy:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Economic and Monetary Affairs:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Regional policy:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Development:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Climate action:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Internal Market and Services:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
> Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>	> Home Affairs:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>
		> Agriculture and Rural Development:	<input type="text" value="&gt;&gt;"/>

**14. Has your organisation in the last year responded to public consultations launched by the European Commission?**

If yes, in which fields?

Please overwrite these words

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**15. If your lobbying activities target the European Parliament, which Committees are the most important for the interests of your organisation/members/clients?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

> Foreign Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Regional Development:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Development:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Agriculture and Rural Development:	>> <input type="text"/>
> International Trade:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Fisheries:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Budgets:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Culture and Education:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Budgetary Control:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Legal Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Economic and Monetary Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Employment and Social Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Constitutional Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Environment, Public Health and Food Safety:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Women's Rights and Gender Equality:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Industry, Research and Energy:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Petitions:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Internal Market and Consumer Protection:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Financial, Economic and Social Crisis:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Transport and Tourism:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Policy Challenges Committee:	>> <input type="text"/>

**16. If your activities target the Council of Ministers, which Council's configurations are the most important for the interests of your organisation?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

> The European Council:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Competitiveness:	>> <input type="text"/>
> General Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Transport, Telecommunications and Energy:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Foreign Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Agriculture and Fisheries:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Economic and Financial Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>	> Environment:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Justice and Home Affairs (JHA):	>> <input type="text"/>	> Education, Youth and Culture:	>> <input type="text"/>
> Employment, Social Policy, Health & Consumer Affairs:	>> <input type="text"/>		

**17. We are interested to know some information about your contacts with different actors in Brussels.**

How often do you have contacts with these actors?

Please select the options from Never (0) till Daily (5)

> European Commission	>> <input type="text"/>
> European Parliament	>> <input type="text"/>
> Council of Ministers	>> <input type="text"/>
> European Economic and Social Committee	>> <input type="text"/>
> Committee of the Regions	>> <input type="text"/>
> EFTA	>> <input type="text"/>
> ESA	>> <input type="text"/>

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**18. Do you have any difficulties/major shortcomings in the carrying out of your EU lobbying activities?**

>>

If yes, can you describe them?

*Please overtype these words*

**19. In terms of effectiveness, please assess your EU lobbying activities, during the last two years?**

*Please rate on a scale from 0(no efficient) to 5 (very efficient)*

>>

**20. Can you give one or more examples of successful achievements of EU lobbying activities conducted by your organisation?**

*Please overtype these words*

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**21. Has your organisation participated in EU funded projects?**

&gt;&gt;

If yes, through which funding programmes?

*Please overtype these words***22. Has your organisation participated in European projects funded OUTSIDE the EU?**

&gt;&gt;

If yes, through which funding programmes?

*Please overtype these words***23. We are interested in hearing your view on the factors that are important for successful lobbying.****In your view, how important are the following factors for the overall efficiency of the EU lobbying activities of your organisation:***Please rate on a scale from 0 (no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)*

&gt; Staff size

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Staff with experience in dealing with the EU:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; An overall planning of goals of lobbying:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Budgetary resources:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Concentration of intervention on a limited number of key activities:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Establishing a clear strategy towards the EU:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Coordinating lobbying activities with organisations with similar interests:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Support by the headquarters in case of a representation office in Brussels:

&gt;&gt;

&gt; Continuity and long-term perspectives:

&gt;&gt;

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**24. Do you think that the non-EU membership of Norway has an impact on the EU lobbying activities of your organisation?**

>>

If yes, could you explain what kind of impact?

*Please overtype these words*

If no, could you explain why?

*Please overtype these words*

**25. Is your organisation registered on the European Commission's voluntary register set up through the European Transparent Initiative?**

>>

If yes, since when?

>>

**26. Is your organisation, through its actors, registered on the European Parliament's mandatory register of lobbyists?**

>>

If yes, since when?

>>

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**27. How important is the relation between your organisation and the Norwegian government regarding the EU lobbying activities of your organisation?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

**28. Do you have contacts with EFTA (the European Free Trade Association) or ESA (EFTA Surveillance Authority) in your EU lobbying activities?**

**29. If you have contacts with EFTA, how important are they?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

**And for what purpose?**

*Please overtype these words*

**30. Has your organisation developed strategic partnership or systematic contacts with other organisations in Norway that are lobbying the EU?**

Please rate on a scale from 0(no relevance) to 5 (very relevant)

**If yes, which ones are the most important?**

*Please overtype these words*

**31. To what extent does your organisation use European federations for its EU lobbying activities and for what purpose?**

*Please overtype these words*

**PART I - Questions for all respondents**

Date

25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

When we use lobbying in this questionnaire we imply influencing the EU decision-making, gathering information and more general contact with EU institutions and other organisations in Brussels.

**32. To what extent do you use your eventual daughter companies in EU member countries for lobbying the EU?**

*Please overtype these words*

**33. Does your organisation have currently an office in Brussels?**

**If yes, when it was established?**

**If no, but it has had an office previously in Brussels:**

> When was it established?

> When was it closed?

> What was the main reason for closing the office in Brussels?

*Please overtype these words*

> Do you plan to reopen an office in Brussels?

**PART II - Questions for organisation WITH an office in Brussels**

Date 25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

**1. What is the address of your office in Brussels?**

Please overtype these words

**2. Who is currently the Director of the office?****3. What is approximately the surface of your office?****4. What is the legal structure of your office?**

Please tick the correct answer(s)

> Interest representation

> Trade association

> Public Affairs agency

> NGO

> Trade union

> Company

> Think-thank

> Individual/Independent

> Law and/or Consultancy firm

> Others:

Please overtype these words

**5. Does your organisation have a head office in Norway?**

If yes:

What is the address

What does it represent in Norway, if it is an interest organisation?

Who is currently the Director of the EU or International Affairs department?

What is its legal structure? Please tick the correct answer(s)

Please tick the correct answer(s)

> Interest representation

> Trade association

> Public Affairs agency

> NGO

> Trade union

> Company

> Think-thank

> Individual/Independent

> Law and/or Consultancy firm

> Others:

Please overtype these words

**6. How many persons are currently working in your office in Brussels?****7. Of the persons employed in your office, how many work as:**

> Management staff:

> Officials with an university degree:

> Officials without an university degree:

> Administrative staff:

> Trainees:

**PART II - Questions for organisation WITH an office in Brussels**

Date 25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
 Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

8. Of the persons employed in your office, how many are not Norwegian nationals?

9. Is your office using external consultants?  
 Please rate on a scale from 0 (never) to 5 (very often):

10. Do you organise public seminars/meetings in your office or at other places in Brussels?  
 Please rate on a scale from 0 (never) to 5 (very often):

11. How is your office in Brussels funded?  
 Please tick the relevant answer(s)

- > By local/regional authorities in Norway
- > By funding from the head office
- > By private partners/clients
- > By public funding

12. What is the annual budget of your office for 2009? Please tick the relevant answer(s)

- \* For staff:
- \* For rent of the office facilities:
- \* For additional lobbying activities, such as lunches, travels, organisation of events etc.:

13. How does your office communicate information about the EU with the head office in Norway, if any?  
 Please tick the relevant answer(s)

- > Through sending regular news/newsletters/reports
- > Through displaying information on the website
- > Through the organisation of appropriate events/meetings
- > Through study visits
- > Others:

Please overtype these words

14. Has your office developed strategic partnership or systematic contacts with other lobbying organisations in Brussels?

If yes, which ones are the most important?

Please overtype these words

15. What is the importance for your office of the Norwegian Mission to the European Union?  
 Please rate on a scale from 0 (no relevance) to 5 (very relevant):

16. Does your office lobby other institutions in Brussels than those of the EU?  
  
 If yes, which ones ?

Please overtype these words

17. Does your office try to work in cooperation with other international organisations not represented in Brussels or countries outside the EU?  
  
 If yes, which ones?

Please overtype these words

**PART III - Questions for organisation WITHOUT an office in Brussels**

Date 25-10-10

Norwegian School of Management – BI  
Professor Kjell A. Eliassen

**1. What is the legal structure of your organisation in Norway?**

Please tick the relevant answer(s)

- > Interest representation
- > Trade association
- > Public Affairs agency
- > NGO
- > Trade union
- > Company
- > Think-thank
- > Individual/Independent
- > Law and/or Consultancy firm
- > Others:

Please overtype these words

**2. What is the size of your organization?**

- Number of staff:
- How many persons are involved in EU affairs:
- Approximate number of members if a federation:
- Approximate nber of offices/daughter companies outside Norway if an international organisation:

**3. What is the approximate budget of your organisation for EU related activities?**

Please tick the correct answer(s)

.....

**4. What are the strengths and weakness of not being represented in Brussels?**

Strengths

Please overtype these words

Weaknesses

Please overtype these words

**5. Do you think that your organisation could better influence the EU decision-making if it had an office in Brussels?****6. If more resources were available in your organisation, would you consider opening an office in Brussels?****7. How often do representatives of your organisation involved in EU affairs travel to Brussels?**

Please rate on a scale from 0 (never) to 5 (very often):

- > Rather weekly
- > Monthly
- > 2-3 times/year
- > Yearly
- > Never

**8. Does your organisation hire lobbyists in Brussels to represent its interests/members/clients?**

Please rate on a scale from 0 (never) to 5 (very often):

**9. If your organisation hires lobbyists in Brussels, could you specify in which policy field and for choosing lobbyists?**

Please overtype these words







## ANDRE RAPPORTER I SERIEN

**RAPPORT # 1: «Forvaltningsmessige konsekvenser av EØS/EU. Sentraladministrasjonen – norsk og europeisk.»**  
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Av Torben Foss



# Europautredningen

Utvalget for utredning av Norges avtaler med EU

Den 7. januar 2010 besluttet Regjeringen å nedsette et forskningsbasert, bredt sammensatt offentlig utvalg som skal foreta en grundig og bredest mulig gjennomgang av EØS-avtalen og konsekvensene av avtalen på alle samfunnsområder.

## Utvalgets mandat er som følger:

«Utvalget skal foreta en bred og grundig vurdering av politiske, rettslige, forvaltningsmessige, økonomiske og andre samfunnsmessige konsekvenser (herunder velferds- og distriktspolitiske) av EØS-avtalen.

Det skal legges særlig vekt på å vurdere betydningen av utviklingen i EU og EØS etter inngåelsen av EØS-avtalen for avtalens omfang- og virkemåte. Eksempler på områder det kan være naturlig å utrede er bl.a. distriktspolitikk, demokrati på alle styringsnivå, nærings- og arbeidsliv samt forvaltning av naturressurser og miljø. Utvalgets arbeid skal inkludere en gjennomgang av erfaringene med Schengen-avtalen og øvrige samarbeidsordninger med EU.

Utvalget skal ha vekt på beskrivelser og vurderinger av EØS-avtalens og øvrige avtaler/samarbeidsordningers betydning og virkemåte. Arbeidet i organene som ble opprettet for å overvåke EØS-avtalens funksjon, vurderes også.»

## Utvalgsmedlemmer:

Fredrik Sejersted (leder), Liv Monica Bargem Stubholt (nestleder), Frank Aarebrot, Lise Rye, Dag Seierstad, Helene Sjursen, Fredrik Bøckman Finstad, Kate Hansen Bundt, Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, Jonas Tallberg, Jon Erik Dølvik, Peter Arbo. Sekretariatet ledes av Ulf Sverdrup, og er lokalisert ved Senter for europarett (UiO). For mer informasjon se: [www.europautredningen.no](http://www.europautredningen.no)



# Europautredningen

Utvalget for utredning av Norges avtaler med EU

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